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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effect of different types of foreign aid on tax revenues in West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. A fixed-effects panel model with 
instrumental variables was developed over the period spanning from 1985 to 2016. The results 
indicate that multilateral aid affects positively and significantly tax revenues while bilateral aid 
does not. Moreover, the analysis of the decomposed effect of aid revealed that concessional aid 
and technical assistance enhance fiscal resources mobilization. However, grants reduce tax 
effort. The results also show that when aid is aggregated, its effect on tax revenues is 
ambiguous. These results justify for many reasons the reorientation of foreign aid towards 
investment for effective tax systems in WAEMU countries in compliance with Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda 2015 of the third international conference on Financing for Development. 
Strengthening multilateral partnership is advocated in accordance with the 17th Sustainable 
Development Goals. Also, an improvement of institutional quality could make foreign aid more 
efficient for tax collection in the study areas. 
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1. Introduction 
For several decades, the relations between West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU)1 countries and the developed countries are dominated by the official development 
aid (ODA) which represents an important source of financing in these countries (Dreher et al., 
2018; Ndikumana and Pickbourn 2017; Bia, 2017). According to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics, WAEMU countries received on 
average a net ODA flow of 15.12% of their average GDP over the last three decades (OECD, 
2018).  
 
In parallel with aid flows these countries receive from developed countries, intergovernmental 
organizations and multilateral institutions; the domestic resources mobilization, especially 
fiscal resources, has become a crucial issue for these countries (Morissey, 2018; Yohou et al., 
2016). For this purpose, the heads of State and Government of the Union have taken decisions 
and directives with a view to create a regional common market which promotes a better 
allocation of resources to ensure greater equity between consumers within the Union 
(WAEMU, 2012)2. The implicit objective of these directives is to promote a strong mobilization 
of fiscal resources because the need of public resources is particularly important for the 
achievement of development goals such as Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the 
African Union Agenda 2063 targets. 
 
Indeed, it's possible to perform a comparative analysis of the evolution of foreign aid volumes 
and tax revenues in WAEMU countries from 1985 to 2016 through the figure presented bellow 
(Figure 1). It indicates that WAEMU countries are highly aid-dependent countries. So, in 
average, the tax revenue in percentage of GDP (12.1) is less than foreign aid in percentage of 
GDP (15.12). Digging into details, it is notable that, in some countries of this Union, aid-to-
GDP exceeds far their tax revenue-to-GDP. This is the case of Guinea Bissau (5.08 against 
33.03), Niger (11.18 against 26.01), Mali (11.23 against 14.02) and Burkina Faso (11.47 against 
13.18). In contrary, in the other countries of the Union (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and 
Togo), even though tax revenues are higher than foreign aid, the latter remains an important 
source of financing. 
                                                             
1
  - The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) includes the following countries: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
2
  - Some decisions taken by the WAEMU Commission: Decision N.01 / 98 / CM / UEMOA of 03 July 1998 
adopting the program for the harmonization of internal indirect taxation within WAEMU; Decision N.10 / 2006 / 
CM / UEMOA of 23 March 2006 adopting the tax transition program within WAEMU; Decision N.16 / 2006 / 
CM / UEMOA of 16 December 2006 adopting the Program for harmonization of direct taxation within WAEMU. 
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In view of these stylized facts, foreign aid seems to be a direct and important revenue source 
for the WAEMU countries. There are legitimate concerns, therefore, as to whether foreign aid 
is encouraging or disincentives countries to mobilize fiscal resources. In fact, aid is likely to 
affect the behavior of States by reducing the effort that States provide in terms of resource 
mobilization (Addison et al., 2017). That is why the purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
effects of the different types of official development assistance on the tax revenues of the 
countries of the WAEMU zone. 
 
In this paper, we distinguish bilateral aid from multilateral aid (Appendix: Appendix 1 & 2). 
We also distinguish concessional loans and technical assistance from grants contained in 
foreign aid (Appendix 2). In conducting these analyzes which stands out from existing studies, 
our research will therefore identify policy implications for the type (s) of assistance needed to 
stimulate tax resource mobilization in WAEMU countries. This work is in line with one of the 
recommendations of Addis Ababa Action 2015, related to the reorientation of official 
development assistance towards investment for effective tax systems in Africa (United Nations, 
2017). The paper also contributes to the existing empirical literature on the relationship between 
external aid and tax revenues. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The section 2 presents the literature review that 
addresses the analysis of the relationship between foreign aid and the fiscal resources 
mobilization. The methodological approach and the discussion of the main results are presented 
in sections 3 and 4, respectively. The section 5 contains the conclusion and economic policy's 
implications. 
 
2. Literature review 
In the economic literature, analysis of the effect of official development assistance on the fiscal 
resource’s mobilization leads to controversial conclusions. Some studies support the idea that 
aid through its components (grants, loans and technical assistance) can raise the level of tax 
revenue mobilization in developing countries (Combes et al., 2016, Dedehouanou and 
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Dedehouanou (2017). Other studies indicate that an increase in foreign aid can have a crowding-
out effect on the effort to mobilize tax revenue in recipient countries (Gupta et al., 2004, Crivelli 
and Gupta, 2017). In the impossibility of making a complete tour of this literature we are 
interested in the essential points of the recent studies which dealt with the question. 
 
2.1. Bilateral aid, multilateral aid and fiscal resources mobilization 
Regarding the effects of different forms of aid, an economic literature review reveals that very 
few studies have examined the influence of bilateral and multilateral aid in recipient countries 
(Radelet, 2006; Dankov et al., 2008; Jeffrey, 2015). It should be noted that these studies have 
focused on the ability of bilateral and multilateral aid to promote the economic growth of 
recipient countries rather than the fiscal resources mobilization. To our knowledge, one of the 
few studies that analyze the effect of bilateral aid on the fiscal resource’s mobilization is the 
paper of Dedehouanou and Dedehouanou (2017). Using an endogenous Hansen threshold 
model, the authors have shown that the fragmentation of bilateral aid contributes to a reduction 
in tax revenues in the Union. However, one of the shortcomings of this study is related to the 
omission of other different types of foreign aid. For instance, technical assistance, concessional 
loans and grants are not taken into account in their study.  
 
2.2. Technical assistance, concessional loans, grants and fiscal resources mobilization 
Regarding the effects of the various components of foreign aid on tax revenues, several previous 
studies can be mentioned. The seminal paper of Gupta et al. (2004), for example, analyzed the 
impact of international assistance on tax revenues in 107 countries between 1970 and 2000. The 
results revealed that, unlike grants, loans have a positive effect on tax revenues. In addition, the 
study found a negative effect of total development assistance on domestic revenue mobilization. 
The authors deduce that the negative effect of grants outweighs the positive effect of loans. As 
a result, the overall effect becomes negative. However, the study concludes that these results 
are country-specific. 
 
Decades before the work of Gupta et al. (2004), Heller (1975) analyzed the fiscal behavior of 
recipient countries following an increase in international development aid in developing 
countries. The results revealed that international aid is reducing the level of tax collection in 
these countries. This means that the assumption that development aid disincentives to mobilize 
fiscal resources in recipient countries is maintained. 
 
Concerning contemporary research on the subject, let us note those carried out by Clist and 
Morrissey (2011). The authors relied on the paper of Gupta et al. (2004) to examine the effect 
of foreign aid, including loans and grants, on the fiscal effort in 82 developing countries 
between 1970 and 2005. Although their results showed that, specifically, loans affected 
positively tax revenues; any increase in overall aid leads to lower tax revenues. In addition, the 
more these countries receive grants, the more tax revenues are reduced. 
 
Another contemporary study that relied heavily on the analyzes of Gupta et al. (2004) is the 
work of Benedek et al. (2012). The authors examined the relationship between aid and tax 
revenues in 118 countries over the period 1980-2009. The results found confirm those of Gupta 
et al. (2004). Loans positively influence tax revenues, while grants and total aid affect them 
negatively. In addition, the authors noted that countries that do not have high quality 
institutions, especially where corruption is pervasive, are more affected by a drastic reduction 
in the level of tax revenue as a result of increasing in grants. 
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For Carter (2013), previous research that concluded the negative impact of grants on the 
mobilization of fiscal resources probably used simple statistical models with strong 
econometric assumptions. He supports this criticism by showing that the results of this earlier 
research disappear when more general and robust econometric methods are applied to analyze 
the same data. According to the author, estimates on panel data will be more robust. It also finds 
a positive impact of donations on tax revenues, which can be explained in part by developing 
countries’ awareness of the importance of mobilizing domestic revenue. 
 
So far, most of studies evoked have been done on panel data. We will now discuss some country 
cases. For this purpose, Chaudhry and Munir (2010) analyzed the factors that cause Pakistan's 
low tax revenues. The results indicated that Foreign aid, considered in their model as an 
explanatory variable, influenced negatively tax collection in the Pakistani economy. However, 
this effect was not significant. A similar result has been found in the works of Hisali and 
Ddumba-Ssentamu (2013). They also found that donations had a negative effect on tax revenues 
in Uganda. However, this negative effect of grants was offset by the positive impact of loans 
(Benedek et al., 2012). 
 
In the context of WAEMU countries, the only reference study, to our knowledge, that analyzes 
the effects of aid on tax revenues is the paper of Yohou et al. (2016). The authors find a positive 
and significant effect of international aid on tax revenues. However, the study does not take 
into account Benin and Guinea Bissau. This study differs from the work of Yohou et al. (2016) 
by taking into account all WAEMU countries. In addition, it captures the effect of different 
types of foreign aid and highlight the type of support that could enhance the fiscal resources 
mobilization. Another inadequacy of their paper is related to the foreign aid endogeneity issue, 
which is not well treated in our opinion. However, the rigorous treatment of the endogeneity of 
aid is a major issue in studies dealing with aid effectiveness (Brun et al., 2008, Thornton, 2014). 
Our study also tries to fill this gap. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
For the purpose of our analysis, we draw on Heller's (1975) theoretical model, which describes 
the behavior of a beneficiary country in term of aid flows. It is a utility function that assumes 
that the recipient country of aid aims to maximize the social welfare of its citizens under its 
budget constraint. Based on this model, Batten (2010) and Hussen (2014) respectively analyzed 
the fiscal behavior of the government of Papua New Guinea and Ethiopia facing to foreign aid. 
This model is applied as part of our analysis because it has a foundation from economic theory 
(Heller, 1975). Governments in developing countries are supposed to be rational. They try to 
optimize their spending because their national resources are limited. They therefore face a 
budget constraint, and thus have to choose between alternative benefits with their limited 
income. 
 
Thus, assuming that government preferences can be expressed with the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function, we can write: 
 𝑈(𝐶𝐸𝑡, 𝑅𝐸𝑡) = 𝐶𝐸𝑡𝛼𝑅𝐸𝑡𝛼−1                                                                                                           (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑡 and 𝑅𝐸𝑡 represent respectively the capital goods (equipment, etc.) and the current 
goods (other goods) of period t. On the basis of studies of Fagernäs and Schurich (2004) and 
Ouattara (2006), the basic fiscal identity in conventional public accounting is represented by: 𝐸 − (𝑇 + 𝐺) = 𝐵 + 𝐹                                                                                                                   (2) 
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where (𝐸) is the total expense; (𝑇) is the national income; (𝐺), foreign grants, (𝐵) is national 
funding and (𝐹) is foreign funding. It is the equality between the government's budget balance 
and its total funding requirement. The reorganization of this identity gives: 
 𝐸 − 𝑇 = 𝐵 + 𝐴                                                                                                                               (3) 
 
where external aid (𝐴) is the sum of donations (𝐺) and foreign loans (𝐹). (𝐸 −  𝑇) then 
becomes the deficit before subsidies (Fagernäs and Schurich, 2004). Based on this formulation, 
this study also uses the collection of tax resources and official development assistance to 
determine the fiscal constraint facing by the recipient country. Differences between 
expenditures and revenues are then captured by changes in the government's level of 
indebtedness. The budget constraint is therefore written as follows: 
 𝑃𝐶𝐸,𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑡 − (𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑡) = 𝐷𝐵𝑡                                                                          (4) 
 
where, foreign aid 𝐴𝑡  is the sum of grants 𝐺𝑡, loans 𝐿𝑡 and technical assistance 𝑇𝐴𝑡. Tax 
revenue 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 is the sum of direct taxes 𝐷𝑇𝑋𝑡 and indirect 𝐼𝑇𝑋𝑡, 𝐷𝐵𝑡   is domestic borrowing 
and 𝑃𝑡 is the price of public goods. The specific amount of aid that the recipient country 
estimates to be used to reduce taxes / borrowings or to change the composition of capital and 
operating expenses is represented by 𝛽. The problem of maximizing public utility can be written 
as follows: 
 {𝑀𝐴𝑋: 𝑈(𝐶𝐸𝑡, 𝑅𝐸𝑡) = 𝐶𝐸𝑡𝛼𝑅𝐸𝑡𝛼−1                              𝑆𝐶 𝑃𝐶𝐸,𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑡 − (𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑡) = 𝐷𝐵𝑡                                                                (5) 
 
The application of the Lagrangian for the resolution of problem translated by the system (5) is 
written: 
 ℒ = 𝐶𝐸𝑡𝛼𝑅𝐸𝑡𝛼−1 + 𝜆(𝑃𝐶𝐸,𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑡 − 𝐷𝐵𝑡 − 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 − 𝛽𝐴𝑡)                                     (6) 
 
According to the conditions of first order (FOC), we have the following equations: 𝜕ℒ𝜕𝐶𝐸  =  0  ⟹    𝛼𝐶𝐸𝑡𝛼−1𝑅𝐸𝑡𝛼−1 + 𝜆𝑃𝐶𝐸,𝑡 = 0                                                             (7) 
 𝜕ℒ𝜕𝑅𝐸  =  0   ⟹    (𝛼 − 1)𝐶𝐸𝑡𝛼𝑅𝐸𝑡𝛼−2 + 𝜆𝑅𝐸,𝑡 = 0                                                     (8) 
 𝜕ℒ𝜕𝜆   =  0  ⟹    𝑃𝐶𝐸,𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝐸,𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑡 − 𝐷𝐵𝑡 − 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 − 𝛽𝐴𝑡 = 0                           (9) 
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When we reorganize these first-order conditions (CPO) from equation (7) to equation (9) and 
substitute the prices of public goods assumed equal to one (unity), we deduce the following 
structural equations: 𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼2𝛼 − 1 (𝐷𝐵𝑡 + 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑡)                                                                             (10) 𝑅𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 − 12𝛼 − 1 (𝐷𝐵𝑡 + 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽𝐴𝑡)                                                                            (11) 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 = 𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑡 − 𝐷𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽𝐴𝑡                                                                                  (12) 𝐷𝐵𝑡 = 𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑡 − 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑡 − 𝛽𝐴𝑡                                                                                  (13) 𝐴𝑡 = 1𝛽 (𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑡 − 𝐷𝐵𝑡 − 𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑇𝑡)                                                                            (14) 
 
According to Batten (2010) and Hussen (2014), we find that, from these equations, the 
structural relationship translated by equation (12) links tax revenues to foreign aid, expenditure 
level and domestic borrowing variations. We therefore deduce the following equation: 
 𝑇𝑋𝑇 = 𝑓(𝐶𝐸, 𝑅𝐸, 𝐴, 𝐷𝐵)                                                                                                              (15) 
 
From this relation (15), one can specify several others taking into account the interest and the 
objective of the researcher. The empirical model is thus defined from this equation. 
 
3.2. Empirical setup 
Our study analyzes the effect of foreign aid on tax revenues. Indeed, six econometric models 
are estimated. So, the first model includes aggregated official development assistance and the 
other control variables. Then two other models take into account bilateral aid and multilateral 
aid separately. Finally, the last three models disintegrate global foreign aid in loans, technical 
assistance and grants. Thus, from the theoretical model developed above, we now specify an 
empirical model on panel data that is presented as follows: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∝ +𝛾1𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑗𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑘𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑗=1                              (16) 
with  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                           (17) 
 i = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, t = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (1985 − 2016),  𝑗 = 1, 2   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑘 = 1, 2  𝑎𝑛𝑑  3. 
Different types of aid can be written in a matrix form as follows 𝐴𝑃𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 = [ 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡]                    and                 𝐴𝑃𝐷𝐶𝑖𝑡 = [𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡]                                   
In this equation (7), from left to right, are labeled: 
 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡  : tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. It represents the tax rate. This is the 
explained variable of the model. Data for this variable were extracted from the 
Multilateral Surveillance Database of the WAEMU Commission. 
 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 : the official development assistance (overall) received by each country in the 
study sample. It is related to GDP (% of GDP). 
 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 : aid forms as a percentage of GDP. It includes bilateral aid (𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡) and 
multilateral aid (𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡).  𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 : other components of foreign aid. This matrix takes into account concessional 
loans (𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 , technical cooperation assistance (𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡) and the grant component 
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(𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡). All these variables (different types of aid) are valued in percentage of GDP. 
Data on the different types of aid are found in the OECD Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS). 
 
Based on the existing literature, we have set expectations on our parameters related to our 
variables of interest. Indeed, we assume that the coefficients  𝛾1 ≤ 0, 𝜆1 ≤ 0, 𝜆2 ≥ 0 on the 
one hand, and 𝜑1 ≥ 0, 𝜑2 ≥ 0 et 𝜑3 ≤ 0, on the other hand. 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a matrix of control variables that can explain tax revenues. Stotsky and Wolde (1997) 
have identified more than a dozen variables that may have an effect on tax resources 
mobilization. However, in this study, we limit their number to better appreciate the influence 
of our variables of interest3. This  𝑋𝑖𝑡   matrix includes: agricultural value added 𝑉𝐴𝑎𝑔, industrial 
value added  𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑛 , trade openness 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 , GDP per capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶), secondary school 
enrollment rate (𝐻𝐾). The data for all these variables are taken from the World Development 
Indicator (WDI). Regarding the institutional quality variables, this study used three indicators 
of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): Corruption Control (𝐶𝑂𝑅), Political Stability 
(𝑃𝑆𝑇) and Bureaucratic Quality (𝐵𝑈𝑄). These variables are important because questions 
relating to the taxes collection cannot be studied independently of institutional issues, especially 
corruption, which combines fraud and tax malfeasance. Two other institutional quality variables 
are added as shown in the data source table (Table 1) for robustness checks. 
 
Table 1: Source of the variables of the model 
Name Description Source 
TAXR Fiscal / Tax Revenue (% of GDP) WAEMU Database 
ODA Official Development Assistance (US Dollars) OECD Database 
ODA_BIL Bilateral Aid OECD Database 
ODA_MUL Multilateral Aid OECD Database 
ODA_CL Concessional Loans of Aid OECD Database 
ODA_TA Technical Assistance Aid OECD Database 
ODA_GR Grants or Donations OECD Database 
VA_AG Agricultural Value Added World Bank Database (WDI) 
VA_IN Industrial Value Added World Bank Database (WDI) 
GDPC Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita (USD) World Bank Database (WDI) 
TOPEN Trade openness (%) Computed using WDI 
HK Secondary School Enrollment Rate World Bank Database (WDI) 
COR Corruption ICRG 
GST Government Stability ICRG 
BUQ Bureaucracy Quality ICRG 
DA Democratic Accountability ICRG 
LO Law and Order ICRG 
Source: Author (2019), variables compiled 
 
3.3.Descriptive analysis of variables of the model 
The study has covered all eight WAEMU countries based on the agreement establishing the 
WAEMU in January 10, 1994. So, descriptive statistics of the sample for all variables from 
1985 to 2016 are presented in the table below (Table 2). At this step, we focus primarily on the 
variables of interest. For this purpose, it can be seen that the number of observations for the 
                                                             
3
  - The choice of these specific variables was made basing on matrix of correlations between the variables of the model. Thus, 
variables were selected rigorously in order to avoid statistical biases and to reduce the risks of multi-collinearity. 
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different variables is not identical. This is explained by the number of missing data for selected 
variables. Consequently, we worked on a unbalanced panel. Specifically, all over the period of 
the study, the average tax revenue (12.10% of GDP) is very lower than the average of foreign 
aid (15.12% of GDP). This comparison highlights the aid-dependence of WAEMU countries. 
Bilateral aid average is 11.04% of GDP compared to 4.40% of GDP for multilateral aid. In 
addition, it can be noted that, concessional loans are the main component of aid. Its average of 
5.95% of GDP is higher than that of technical cooperation (5.10% of GDP), which in turn is 
much higher than grants (2.76% of GDP). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables of the model, 1985-2016 
Variables Observations Means Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
TAXR 251 12.10 4.158 1.169 22.98 
ODA 256 15.12 13.22 0.555 78.71 
ODA_BIL 256 11.04 9.549 0.058 53.08 
ODA_MUL 256 4.402 3.875 0.078 21.46 
ODA_CL 256 5.954 5.086 0.240 34.04 
ODA_TA 256 5.101 4.344 0.204 28.97 
ODA_GR 256 2.763 2.353 0.110 15.69 
VA_AG 207 34.66 10.04 13.77 62.38 
VA_IN 207 20.06 5.024 9.758 32.82 
TOPEN 210 38.03 19.28 14.31 118.1 
GDPC 256 674.4 320.4 131.6 1639 
HK 256 21.64 12.85 3.212 55.91 
COR 256 2.223 0.763 0000 4.000 
GST 256 7.204 2.093 2.333 11.00 
BUQ 256 1.470 0.783 0.070 3.500 
Source: Based on data from WDI, OECD and ICRG 
 
Regarding other variables of the model, the agricultural and industrial sectors can be sources of 
tax revenue mobilization. Descriptive statistics indicate that the average value added of the 
agricultural sector (34.66% of GDP) is higher than that of industry (19.98% of GDP). This 
highlights the importance of both sectors in the economies of the Union. Moreover, we 
characterize graphically the nature of the relationship between aggregate aid, different types of 
aid and tax revenues. Thus, we have plotted the figure below (Figure 2). It appears that, 
whatever the type of aid, the relationship between the aid and tax revenues seems to be negative. 
However, this is a partial conclusion at this stage of the study. 
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3.4.Econometric procedure 
3.4.1. Econometric pre-estimation tests 
Among the pre-estimation tests carried out during this study, we can mention the multi-
collinearity test, stationarity test and specification test (Hausman [1978] test). The results of the 
first test (Table 3) revealed the existence of a proven risk of multi-collinearity between the 
aggregated aid and its different components or types (disaggregated form). Then, we 
constructed the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) statistic to test the multi-collinearity. Its value 
is on average 4.64, substantially equal to 5 (Table 4). Since the VIF statistics associated with 
some variables, specially, aid variables have exceeded 5 (individual VIFs). These variables 
cannot be maintained in the same model because the observed problem is likely to bias the 
results of the estimates. Regarding the unit root test, we applied Fisher's test. The choice of this 
test is justified by the fact that we are dealing with a unbalanced panel. This test is based on 
Dickey-Fuller Augmented test. The t-statistics of this test lead to reject the null hypothesis of 
unit root in the model. These results are robust to the inclusion of deterministic trends or/and 
constants. This leads us to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the series. All 
variables are stationary in level. 
 
3.4.2. Estimation techniques and aid endogeneity issue 
Before specifying the appropriate estimation method and the nature of the model, we applied 
the Hausman test (1978). The results of this test led us to specification a fixed effects model 
where the specific effect is assumed to be fixed in time. In these conditions, the Least Square 
Dummy Variables Estimator (LSDV) is proving to be effective. However, the central issue of 
research work dealing with international aid concerns the consideration of aid endogeneity 
issue. Indeed, it is clear that foreign aid cannot be considered as exogenous. A seminal paper 
published by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) extended by Trumbull and Wall (1994) and 
later by Bandyopadhyay and Vermann (2013) in relation to foreign aid policies revealed that 
the motivations for aid flows to countries in development range from selfish interests to 
generosity. It is therefore necessary to deal with the aid endogeneity issue. To do this, we have 
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not only taken into account the quality of the institutions of the countries of the Union, but also, 
we have used the instruments proposed by Tavarez (2003) and revised by Brun et al. (2008), 
Chauvet et al. (2008), Drabo and Ebeke (2011) and Thornton (2014).  
 
It is aid and global grants weighted by the inverse of the distance between the donor country 
and the beneficiary country, respectively. In addition to these instruments, we generated an 
interaction variable between official development assistance and the weight of trade, measured 
by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. The idea underlying all these procedures 
is that the level of aid received by a given country from one of the major donors is highly 
dependent on geographical and cultural proximity, political alliances and bilateral trade 
between the donor country and the recipient country (Drabo and Ebeke 2011, Mallaye and Yogo 
2015, Thornton 2014). In order to find an efficient and adapted estimator for our study, we 
retreated to the econometric literature that developed many efficient estimators using 
instrumental variable methods and generalized moments (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982, Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). These estimators have the advantage of offering an efficient estimation of 
dynamic models in the presence of endogenous variables. However, even if the Monte-Carlo 
simulations performed by Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005) show the superiority of the corrected 
LSDV estimator compared to the IV and GMM estimators whether in terms of bias or RMSE; 
all these potential estimators have, a priori, advantages and disadvantages given the size of our 
panel and the Hausman test results (1978).
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Variables TAXR ODA ODA_BIL ODA_MUL ODA_CL ODA_TA ODA_GR VA_AG VA_IN TOPEN GDPC HK COR PST BUQ 
TAXR 1.000               
ODA 0.026 1.000              
ODA_BIL 
-0.323 0.932 1.000             
ODA_MUL 0.162 0.641 0.403 1.000            
ODA_CL 0.042 0.897 0.754 0.629 1.000           
ODA_TA 0.174 0.901 0.853 0.594 0.971 1.000          
ODA_GR 
-0.442 0.809 0.685 0.752 0.894 0.867 1.000         
VA_AG 
-0.223 0.335 0.320 0.162 0.239 0.239 0.239 1.000        
VA_IN 0.318 -0.377 -0.313 -0.259 -0.294 -0.294 -0.293 -0.595 1.000       
TOPEN 0.623 -0.272 -0.283 -0.159 -0.318 -0.313 -0.318 0.054 -0.006 1.000      
GDPC 0.276 -0.504 -0.506 -0.207 -0.408 -0.408 -0.408 -0.711 0.498 -0.026 1.000     
HK 0.410 -0.607 -0.601 -0.381 -0.539 -0.539 -0.539 -0.042 0.121 0.407 0.365 1.000    
COR 
-0.215 0.015 0.063 -0.053 0.152 0.152 0.152 -0.426 0.167 -0.189 0.084 -0.362 1.000   
PST 0.235 -0.449 -0.427 -0.281 -0.453 -0.453 -0.453 -0.292 0.320 -0.038 0.331 0.413 -0.201 1.000  
BUQ 0.287 0.149 0.102 0.183 0.173 0.173 0.173 -0.072 0.284 0.285 0.048 0.221 0.203 0.216 1.000 
Source: Output from Stata, based on the compiled data 
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Indeed, for a fixed effects panel like ours, the application of the GMM and LSDVC estimators 
would produce biased results. This econometric logic therefore leads us to retain the fixed 
effects estimator with instrumental variables to make our estimates. 
 
Table 4: Multi-collinearity test results 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ODA 12.16 0.037 
ODA_BIL 10.7 0.064 
ODA_MUL 8.14 0.456 
ODA_CL 5.94 0.168 
ODA_TA 5.72 0.255 
ODA_GR 4.87 0.366 
VA_AG 3.99 0.251 
GDPC 3.2 0.312 
HK 2.64 0.378 
VA_IN 2.02 0.494 
COR 1.9 0.526 
PST 1.78 0.561 
TOPEN 1.63 0.612 
BUQ 1.43 0.698 
Mean VIF 4.64 
 
Source: Output from Stata, based on the compiled data 
 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1. Base model results 
The results of the base model estimates are presented in Table 5. They summarize the effect of 
bilateral and multilateral aid on fiscal resources mobilization. Indeed, it should be noted that 
the results of the reference regression are provided by the first column [1] of the table (baseline 
regressions results). They come from the first model that includes only nine control variables. 
The results show that agriculture has a negative relationship with tax revenues. This result, 
although surprising, could be explained by the fact that taxation of agricultural activities is 
difficult (Milovanovic and Smutka, 2019). Most agricultural practices in the WAEMU 
countries are carried out informally. While agriculture is one of the most important sectors of 
WAEMU economies, it should be noted that it is generally practiced for subsistence purposes. 
Thus, this implies a decrease in tax revenue due to the absence of appropriate tax registers, 
which would logically make collection of the tax extremely difficult. 
 
Concerning the industrial sector, it affects tax revenues positively and significantly, despite the 
relatively weak industrial fabric of the Union countries. Indeed, the industry sector is one of the 
sectors of the economy where transactions take place in a relatively more formal environment, 
with good accounting. As a result, taxation of the industrial sector should be easy since most 
industrial enterprises operate in a formal setting (Macaluso et al., 2019). This justifies this 
positive relationship between industry and tax revenues. 
 
Trade openness is measured in this study as the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services relative to GDP. Since commercial transactions usually take place in a specific place, 
one can imagine that it is easier to collect the tax. By inference, it can be argued that countries 
that are more open to international trade strategically are in a better position to increase tax 
revenues.  
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Table 5: Effect of bilateral aid and multilateral aid on tax revenues 
Variables [1] [2] [3] 
CONS 2.575 1.834 1.902 
 (0.595) (0.731) (0.258) 
ODA 0.011 - - 
 (0.868) - - 
ODA_BIL - -0.371 - 
 - (0.193) - 
ODA_MUL - - 0.206** 
 - - (0.038) 
VA_AG -0.042 -0.297 -0.405 
 (0.561) (0.714) (0.182) 
VA_IN 0.153** 0.316*** 0.299*** 
 (0.043) (0.001) (0.002) 
TOPEN 0.051*** 0.549*** 0.423*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDPC 0.018 0.027 0.051* 
 (0.294) (0.311) (0.092) 
HK 0.071** 0.184** 0.209** 
 (0.041) (0.028) (0.031) 
COR -0.418** -0.553*** -0.628*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.004) 
GST 0.854 0.703 0.483 
 (0.982) (0.292) (0.165) 
BUQ 0.099* 0.394 0.267 
 (0.078) (0.527) (0.293) 
Wald test 9.71 11.05 10.62 
P_values (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nb of countries 08 08 08 
Note: Values in parentheses are p-values; ***, **, * respectively represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
Source: Output from Stata, based on the compiled data 
 
GDP per capita is used as an indicator of the country's level of development. Human capital, 
used as an indicator of fiscal responsibility affects positively tax revenues. As for corruption, it 
negatively influences fiscal resources mobilization. Indeed, the fraudulent practices of certain 
taxpayers and even agents of the tax administration generates a dispersion of tax revenues. 
Moreover, in view of the ranks of the countries of the Union in the ranking established by 
Transparency International for 2018, it is not surprising that the contagion effect that corruption 
has on fiscal administration (tax collector). Regarding the other institutional variables that are 
taken into account in our estimates (political stability and bureaucratic quality), they positively 
affect the mobilization of tax revenues. This means that political stability combined with 
improved bureaucratic quality improves the tax effort. Overall, most of our control variables 
are statistically significant. 
 
At this step of the paper, we find that aggregated aid has an ambiguous effect on tax revenues. 
When one considers the aid in its bilateral and multilateral forms, it emerges a slightly 
contrasting result a priori. Bilateral aid affects negatively tax revenues, while multilateral aid 
influences tax revenues positively and significantly (columns [2] and [3]). The explanation for 
these results could be more on the side of the economic literature, rather than the econometric 
arsenal used. Some researchers argue that bilateral aid revolves around economic and politico-
strategic interests. It is largely aimed at cementing political alliances rather than financing the 
development or implementation of economic policies, including tax policies (Stiglitz 2002, 
Stern 2002, Easterly et al. 2006, Bandyopadhyay and Vermann, 2013). In the case of 
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multilateral aid, it is likely to stimulate the mobilization of fiscal resources through technical 
assistance (Combes et al., 2016). 
 
4.2.Types of aid and fiscal resources mobilization 
As stated in the methodological approach, we have kept our reference equation that integrates 
aggregated aid. From this equation, we estimate three other equations in which we substitute 
aggregated aid by one of its three components or types: loans, technical assistance and grants, 
respectively. These last are this time our variables of interest (Table 6). 
 
Indeed, we can always see that the aid taken in an aggregated form has an ambiguous mixed 
effect on of fiscal resources mobilization (column [1]). The increase in aggregated aid has been 
associated with a non-significant increase in tax revenue. Referring to the economic literature, 
we find that these results corroborate with previous studies one (Gupta et al., 2004; Benedek et 
al., 2012 and Combes et al., 2016). Among the related studies that found the same result, we 
can mention the recent studies of Yohou et al., 2016, that analyzed the conditional effect of aid 
to political stability on tax revenues in WAEMU. 
 
Table 6: Effects of technical assistance, concessional loans and grants on tax revenues 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] 
CONS 2.575 2.733 2.338 2.017 
 (0.595) (0.559) (0.415) (0.623) 
ODA 0.011 - - - 
 (0.868) - - - 
ODA_CL - 0.017** - - 
 - (0.039) - - 
ODA_TA - - 0.021 - 
 - - (0.409) - 
ODA_GR - - - -0.087 
 - - - (0.594) 
VA_AG -0.042 -0.038 -0.053 -0.023 
 (0.561) (0.569) (0.098) (0.461) 
VA_IN 0.153** 0.159** 0.258*** 0.156** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.003) (0.039) 
TOPEN 0.051*** 0.115*** 0.247*** 0.108*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
GDPC 0.018 0.015 0.089 0.024 
 (0.294) (0.299) (0.311) (0.261) 
HK 0.071** 0.068** 0.097** 0.083** 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.028) (0.035) 
COR -0.418** -0.421*** -0.504** -0.435** 
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.042) 
GST 0.854 0.5632 0.3457 0.725 
 (0.982) (0.651) (0.715) (0.249) 
BUQ 0.099* 0.103 0.218 0.068* 
 (0.078) (0.965) (0.541) (0.057) 
Wald test 9.71 8.94 9.16 10.49 
P_values (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nbr of countries 08 08 08 08 
Note: Values in parentheses are p-values; ***, **, * respectively represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
Source: Output from Stata, based on the compiled data 
 
 
AJER, Volume VIII, Issue II, July 2020, N. Bayale 
32 
 
When foreign aid is broken down into concessional loans, technical assistance and grants, only 
concessional loans have a positive and significant impact on tax revenues (column [2] and [3]). 
Regarding grants, they have a negative effect on tax revenues. But their effect is statistically 
non-significant (column [4]). These results, combined with previous ones, suggest that donors 
indirectly fund the reduction of tax collection in recipient countries. Technical assistance 
positively influences tax revenues (Morrissey, 2015). The negative effect of grants can be 
explained by the argument that grants are collected by the governments of a recipient country 
as a source of free funding, with no consideration, and therefore no repayment obligation 
(Benedek et al., 2012; and Morrissey, 2009; Crivelli and Gupta, 2017). In addition, we found 
from our estimation results that concessional loans influence positively tax revenues in our 
estimates. Although surprising, this result could be explained by the fact that concessional loans 
are mandatory repayment. As a result, one can imagine that the concessional loans force the 
governments of the Union to maintain their tax revenues or, at best, to increase (Gupta et al., 
2004). 
 
For the other control variables, there are some changes in the value of the coefficients when 
moving from one equation to another. By contrast, most variables retained their sign and degree 
of significance when compared to the results in Table 5 above. 
 
4.3.Robustness Checks  
To ensure the robustness of the analysis, the following controls are performed: (1) usage of 
other institutional quality variables (Democratic Accountability, and Law and Order) of the 
International Country Risk Guide. These variables are used to construct an institutional quality 
index (IQI)4 with variables (Politic Stability, Corruption and Bureaucracy Quality) contained 
in the basic equation ; (2) the taking into account of interactive variables between different 
types of aid and the institutional quality index that was build, while looking at the aid 
endogeneity issue; and (3) the introduction of a dummy variable that captures the effect of the 
devaluation of the CFA franc. This takes the value "1" from 1994 and "0" otherwise. The results 
are shown in Table 7 below. 
 
Taking into account new indicators is justified by the fact that international aid and the fiscal 
resources mobilization cannot be treated differently (Asongou and Nwachukwu, 2016, Okada 
and Samreth, 2012, Tavares, 2003, Alesina and Weder, 2002). By focusing on our variables of 
interest, we realize that multilateral aid (column [3]), loans (column [4]) and technical 
assistance (column [5]) have kept up their positive effect on tax revenues. Grants (column [6]) 
have also maintained their incentive effects. It is the same for bilateral aid (column [3]). 
Nevertheless, we noted a slight change in the coefficients of some variables. 
                                                             
4
  - The institutional quality index (IQI) constructed is the arithmetic mean of the five following variables values: 
Political Stability, Corruption, Bureaucracy Quality, Democratic Accountability, and Law and Order. 
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Table 7: Results of robustness checks 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CONS 2.392 (0.548) 3.108 (0.804) 2.915 (0.901) 2.491 (0.214) 3.051 (0.512) 3.54 (0.458) 
ODA 0.105 (0.787) - - - - - - - - - - 
ODA* IQI 0.241 (0.549) - - - - - - - - - - 
ODA_BIL - - -0.293 (0.214) - - - - - - - - 
ODA_BIL* IQI - - 0.125 (0.097) - - - - - - - - 
ODA_MUL - - - - 0.303** (0.029) - - - - - - 
ODA_MUL* IQI - - - - 0.891** (0.017) - - - - - - 
ODA_CL - - - - -  0.029** (0.041) - - - - 
ODA_CL* IQI - - - - - - 0.433** (0.028) - - - - 
ODA_TA - - - - - - - - 0.109 (0.478) - - 
ODA_TA* IQI - - - - - - - - 0.417* (0.051) - - 
ODA_GR - - - - - - - - - - -0.193 (0.294) 
ODA_GR* IQI - - - - - - - - - - 0.425 (0.841) 
VA_AG -0.223 (0.258) -0.335 (0.964) -0.378 (0.845) -0.162 (0.457) -0.239 (0.772) -0.379 (0.604) 
VA_IN 0.318** (0.041) 0.347** (0.024) 0.113*** (0.000) 0.199** (0.034) 0.204** (0.019) 0.339 (0.047) 
TOPEN 0.623*** (0000) 0.872** (0.014) 0.528*** (0.000) 0.259*** (0.000) 0.618** (0.032) 0.713** (0.021) 
GDPC 0.276 (0.742) 0.191 (0.845) 0.046* (0.057) 0.207 (0.099) 0.408 (0.521) 0.678 (0.194) 
HK 0.411** (0.024) 0.607** (0.017) 0.461*** (0.009) 0.381*** (0.007) 0.853** (0.037) 0.439 (0.042) 
DUM 0.954 (0.544) 0.451 (0.632) 0.895 (0.734) 0.632 (0.432) 0.337 (0.904) 0.667 (0.331) 
IQI 0.214** (0.048) 0.157* (0.086) 0.163** (0.039) 0.853** (0.037) 0.152** (0.041) 0.521* (0.069) 
Wald test 7.854 8.074 9.201 8.941 7.994 9.158 
P_values (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Note: Values in parentheses are p-values; ***, **, * respectively represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
Source: Output from Stata, based on the compiled data 
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Regarding the interaction variables that are introduced into the model, we realize that the values 
and the significativity of their coefficients seem to meet our expectations. In particular, the 
significativity of the interaction variables between aggregated aid and the institutional quality 
index on the one hand, and between donations and this index, on the other hand, increased. 
However, they still remain no-significant. The general surprise lies in the effect of the 
interactive variable between bilateral aid and the institutional quality index. Its coefficient is 
positive but non-significant. These results highlight the ability of WAEMU countries to 
mobilize fiscal resources in a context of good governance (Asongou and Nwachukwu, 2016, 
Alesina and Weder, 2002, Acemoglu and Weder, 2002, Burnside and Dollar, 2000). In addition, 
the devaluation seems to have no significant effect on tax revenues (Collange and Plane, 1994). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the effect of different types of foreign aid on tax revenues in WAEMU 
countries over the period spanning from 1985-2016. Our results show that multilateral aid 
influences positively and significantly tax revenues of these countries, whereas bilateral aid is 
not. They also indicate that concessional loans and technical assistance have a positive effect 
on tax revenues in these countries while grants disincentives tax collection effort. 
From the results of our analysis, it follows that at least three economic policy implications can 
be formulated: 
 The need for WAEMU countries to strengthen the multilateral partnership to improve, 
through foreign aid, the consolidation of national tax collection capacities according to 
the 17th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG). Particularly in beneficiary countries, an 
improvement in the quality of institutions would be necessary. 
 There is a need to reorient official development assistance towards investments for 
efficient tax systems in recipient countries in line with the 2015 Addis Ababa Action 
Program on Financing for Development. To achieve this, donors, in particular, will be 
able to condition certain disbursements of aid by the efforts made by the countries of 
the Union in terms of domestic resources mobilization. On the side of the WAEMU 
countries, they will have to face the challenge of the taxation of the informal sector 
which constitutes a bonanza, considering the importance or weight of this sector. 
 To remedy the disincentive effect created by grants, we argue that It will be relevant to 
orientate one part of this component of aid to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that target social projects or qualitative works, or to support private sector. 
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